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Happiness Filled the Space of Sadness:
the Weight, Tragedy and Paradox of Milan Kundera’s Freedom
Jeremy Wattles
The University of Edinburgh
Milan Kundera’s choice to open his novel  The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1984) 
with two short chapters discussing Friedrich Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence is, if 
nothing else, unconventional. It foregrounds his engagement with Nietzsche and suggests 
that the novel itself is something of a thought experiment, a working out of how such an 
abstract but compelling idea can have meaning in the world. The myth of eternal return1 
poses, as Kundera’s narrator implies, an ultimate question of existence: will we choose 
that our lives, and therefore our actions, have weight or lightness? Or, as Nietzsche says 
in The Gay Science (1882), “If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would 
transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this 
again and innumerable times again’ would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight!” 
(194). In other words, will this thought enslave an individual or will it empower them? Is 
there  a  paradoxical,  controlling  freedom an  individual  may obtain  by  embracing  the 
vicissitudes of life, in willing that a chance event and its consequences might recur again 
and again?
Kundera’s question, which recasts the old ethical and philosophical query “What 
makes  a  life  go  best?”  into  the  weight/lightness  dichotomy,  also  recalls  Nietzsche’s 
revaluation  of  morals  in  his  On the  Genealogy  of  Morality  (1887).  Like  Nietzsche, 
Kundera asks his reader to question the moral standards of the Judeo-Christian tradition 
and the Enlightenment—essentially the two movements upon which Western civilization 
has  founded  itself.  Another  thinker  whose  work  will  illuminate  this  discussion  is 
Sigmund Freud. Civilization and its Discontents (1930) offers fruitful intersections with 
the libidinal themes in Kundera’s novel. Freud’s book also draws on an understanding of 
Nietzsche,  and Keith Ansell-Pearson’s introduction to Nietzsche’s  Genealogy suggests 
that Freud owes a debt to the Genealogy (Nietzsche 1994: xvi).2 Freud’s meditations on 
mankind’s  repressed  instincts,  like  Nietzsche’s  condemnation  of  asceticism  and 
Kundera’s questioning of the concept of lightness, point toward a tripartite connection 
that I will explore. 
Kundera, as well as Nietzsche and Freud, is concerned not only with the potential 
for  self-liberation,  but  humanity’s  uneasy  relationship  with  society.  As  far  back  as 
Montaigne’s discussion of cannibalism in the sixteenth century, Western philosophy has 
wondered “What is humanity’s true state of nature?” Furthermore, what is lost or gained 
when an individual gives up some of their freedom to society? Nietzsche would argue 
that civilization’s control has stunted humanity’s will to power; Freud would say that 
civilization’s  constricting  rules,  coupled  with  our  destructive  urges,  have  made  us 
neurotic.  Sometimes  Kundera’s  philosophical  stance  seems  to  echo  Freud’s  fatalistic 
assertion  that  psychotherapy  can,  at  best,  “transform hysterical  misery  into  common 
unhappiness”  (qtd.  in  Pinker  2005:  4).  Kundera  takes  his  critique  of  morality  and 
insistence on material being from Nietzsche, but Tomas and Tereza are hardly “blonde 
beasts”  reveling  in  Dionysian  profusion  and  hierarchy;  rather,  they  find  themselves 
confronting  the  restricting  reality  of  Russia’s  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia,  and  must 
reconsider their notions of humanity’s superiority and alleged progress. If complicity with 
the spurious March of Progress does not kill the individual, this stepping down from the 
March, which is essentially a revolt and incompatible with civilization’s doctrines, may 
incite civilization’s lethal ire. Kundera uses Tomas’s dilemma of whether he will give up 
his bachelor ways to be with Tereza, along with the increasingly oppressive society the 
Russians  impose,  as  the  tangible  backdrops  informing  his  philosophical  concerns.  I 
would  first  like  to  discuss  these  philosophical  concerns  of  eternal  recurrence  and 
revaluation of morality, recalling Nietzsche in particular, and then show how they work 
within the novel itself. 
Initially, Kundera uses the concept of eternal return as a means by which he may 
revaluate canonical dualities  such as mind and body, heaven and earth,  lightness and 
weight, strength and weakness. He argues for “a perspective from which things appear 
other than as we know them” (4). As I will show, this perspective also demands that we 
curb our arrogance and give up trying to dominate the world. Thus, a shameless humility 
and an unwavering animal love may achieve a partial freedom from totalitarianism, and 
apprehend that “the closer our lives come to the earth, the more real and truthful they 
become” (Kundera 5). Likewise, a narrative that loops back on itself, and ends before 
Tomas  and  Tereza’s  prophesied  death,  with  them very  much  alive,  offers  a  weighty 
alternative  to  a  linear,  weightless narrative,  an  alternative  to  “the  profound  moral 
perversity of a world that rests essentially on the nonexistence of return” (Kundera 4). 
There is a whole history of philosophy present in Kundera’s question of weight 
versus lightness, a whole tradition and discourse informing these deceptively short and 
plainspoken opening  chapters.  This  history  goes  back  to  the  ancient  Greeks,  but  the 
methodology of the question and Kundera’s naming of Nietzsche calls the Genealogy to 
the fore. In his preface, Nietzsche asks us to trace the origins and constructions of our 
moral  codes  and to  revaluate  our  notions  about  them.  As  Lee  Spinks  suggests,  “the 
methodological question poses the problem of how we determine the concept of ‘value’ 
in the first place…we determine [it] on the basis of prior values” (57, Spinks’s emphasis). 
Alexander Nehamas avers that Nietzsche “is not interested in providing a theory of truth” 
(55). Rather, the important first assertion to recognize is that our morals are historical and 
manmade, not absolute rules derived or divined from a deity. As Foucault argues, “the 
forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but 
respond  to  haphazard  conflicts”  (154).  As  an  example,  Nietzsche  says:  “I  no  longer 
searched for the origin of evil beyond the world,” and then asks “under what conditions 
did man invent the value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves 
have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human flourishing” (Nietzsche 5, his 
emphasis)?  The  conditions  of  invention,  then,  are  haphazard  conflicts,  “attempt[s]  to 
master chance through the will to power” (Foucault 155). 
Historically,  Kundera  argues,  our  preference  has  been  contrary  to  Foucault’s 
random power struggles, it has been instead towards allegedly definite truths, valued as 
lightness. Lightness, Parmenides believed as far back as the 6th century B.C., was positive 
(Kundera 5). This value judgment has had immense and diverse influence on the major 
monotheistic religions, Enlightenment thinkers, and Romantic philosophers and poets. It 
has  been  variously  reaffirmed  and  extended  to  imply  flight,  freedom,  salvation, 
transcendental unity with the sublime, and the purity and primacy of thought. This last 
and positive valuation of the cerebral is especially set against the negative value of the 
physical.  In terms of modern philosophy, the divide between sensory impressions and 
thought begins with Descartes, who famously asserted the primacy of thought (cogito 
ergo  sum)  over  the  delusions  of  material  experience.  For  Kundera  to  question  this 
tradition is, therefore, in the bold Nietzschean spirit of revaluation: “the absolute absence 
of a burden causes man to be lighter than air, to soar into the heights, take leave of the 
earth and his earthly being, and become only half real, his movements as free as they are 
insignificant” (5). 
Turning  to  Nietzsche  himself,  he  has  two  main  targets  in  the  Genealogy: 
Christianity,  which  he  famously  declared  in  Beyond  Good  and  Evil (1886)  to  be 
“Platonism  for  the  people”  (qtd.  in  Spinks  40),  and  those  philosophers,  like 
Schopenhauer, who had “gilded, deified, and transcendentalized…the instincts of pity, 
self-denial, self-sacrifice…until he was left with them as…‘values as such’ [and] on the 
basis of which he said ‘no’ to life and to himself as well” (7). Christianity’s Platonism 
comes from that ancient Greek philosopher’s notions of forms, which holds that objects 
and  beings  in  the  empirical  world  are  lesser  derivations  of  their  ideal  and  eternal 
templates. Platonic forms have “a greater degree of reality” (Cooper 112). This dovetails 
with the believer’s religious desire/hope that they will ascend to heaven. Since heaven is 
necessarily pure fulfillment and perfection, lightness allows for escape from a supposedly 
disappointing,  corrupt  and  wretched  world.  Nietzsche  rejects  the  “diabolization  of 
nature…from  whose  womb  man  originated  and  to  whom  the  principle  of  evil  is 
imputed…or  of  existence  in  general,  which  is  left  standing  as  inherently  worthless” 
(1994: 67). Rather, Christianity’s “dangerous decision…to find the world ugly and bad 
has made the world ugly and bad” (2001: 123, Nietzsche’s emphasis). 
Likewise, those philosophers who withdraw into the supposedly liberating life of 
the mind,  or  those  who become “contended,  unadventurous,  philistine product[s]”  of 
European nihilism,  have made a  fundamental  mistake (2001:  xiv).  Nietzsche  says  of 
himself, “I have at all times written my writings with my whole heart and soul; I do not 
know what purely intellectual problems are” (1969: 12). R.J. Hollingdale suggests “In a 
man who thinks  like  this,  the  dichotomy between thinking  and feeling,  intellect  and 
passion, has really disappeared. He feels his thoughts. He can fall in love with an idea. An 
idea can make him ill” (1969: 12). Tomas, like Nietzsche, experiences this phenomenon 
when he becomes attracted to the mythic metaphor that Tereza, like Oedipus or Moses, is 
an abandoned child, “Tomas did not realize at the time that metaphors are dangerous. 
Metaphors are not to be trifled with. A single metaphor can give birth to love” (Kundera 
11). Hence, the thought of eternal recurrence is literally, physically, Nietzsche’s heaviest 
burden; it both crushed and transformed him until he broke through his own nihilism. 
Perhaps Tomas arrives at a similar place, in that Tereza has claimed his “poetic memory” 
and  he  finds  it  impossible  to  continue  his  bachelor  lifestyle  (Kundera  209). 
Transformation, revaluation of values such that earthly life reveals itself in its abundance, 
its force and flux—this is what Nietzsche hopes his readers will also experience. 
Nietzsche’s philosophy then,  specifically his genealogical process,  exposes the 
weightlessness of traditional morality. The slave rebellion which produced the priestly 
life, and therefore Christian morality, is unwittingly beneficial in that it “gives rise to a 
soul and hence to knowledge of good and evil” (1994: xv). It was a revaluation of all 
values, but it devalued life. The attitude of shame and guilt toward the present life, only 
yearning for an afterlife (bad conscience), and the subsequent retreat from bodily and 
worldly existence into pure thought (asceticism), became the psychologically sickening 
goal of humanity. Nietzsche claims, diagnostically, “the world has been a madhouse for 
too  long”  (1994:  69)!  Resisting  a priori absolutes,  Nietzsche  contends  that  religious 
commandments, categorical imperatives, and their like produce psychological illness and 
fragmentation;  they  are  not  grounded,  and  must  be  dismantled.  In  the  wake  of 
genealogy’s  negating  move,  we  must  confront  the  death  of  God,  the  failure  of 
metaphysics and the purposelessness of the universe—in short, nihilism. This is where 
eternal  recurrence  becomes  relevant.  As  Bernard  Williams  suggests,  confronting  the 
heaviest  of burdens “tests your ability not to be overcome by the world’s horror and 
meaninglessness” (2001: xv). Rather than being overcome, one must self-overcome. This 
process requires an “intense and painful self-examination…before one can even begin to 
answer  the  demon’s  question  affirmatively”  (Nehamas  163).  One  must  accept  the 
“existential  challenge  of  commitment  and  engagement”  with  life  in  every  moment, 
whether the outcome is rapturous joy or abysmal tragedy (Spinks 126). In so doing, the 
individual will metamorphose, becoming like Nietzsche’s Űbermensch Zarathustra who, 
“in a stronger age than this mouldy, self-doubting present day…will…come to us, the 
redeeming man of great love and contempt” (1994: 71). In the paradoxical juxtaposition 
of concepts like love and contempt, and joy and tragedy, Nietzsche finds redemption. As 
Zarathustra exults, “Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to 
all woe as well. All things are chained and entwined together” (1969: 331-332). Relative 
plurality produces psychological healing and wholeness because it  is  grounded in the 
honest admission that earthly life is contingent. To use Kundera’s words, this grounding, 
this weight, is “an image of life’s most intense fulfillment” (5). 
If  Kundera  incorporates  Nietzschean ideas  into  his  novel  and  values  them as 
positive,  does  he  do  the  opposite  with  Freud?  Take  recurrence  as  an  example—for 
Nietzsche it is the heaviest burden, terrifying at first, but becomes, in the book, something 
that  authenticates  and  affirms  human  life.  For  Freud,  recurrence/the  “compulsion  to 
repeat” is evidence for the death drive’s presence in our divided psyche as well as our 
outward life. The death drive is inextricably intertwined with/“pressed into the service of” 
the upbuilding drive Eros (Freud 56).  Take Tereza’s recurring dreams of death as an 
example—they manifest what Freud might call her lack of “protection against suffering” 
(20) which Tomas puts her through with his several mistresses, and their effects spill over 
into her days where her gestures grow “abrupt and unsteady” (Kundera 21). The death 
drive turned outwards, Leo Bersani argues, has its “sexual components expunged,” and 
manifests as an oceanic, aggressive force, which contributes to our unhappiness within 
civilization (Freud xiv). This increasingly pessimistic conception of the drives as fluid 
and  pervasively  destructive  complicates  the  neat  binary  valuation  of  recurrence  as 
positive and linearity as negative. One could argue that the instances of recurrence in 
Kundera’s  text  have  the  additional  negative  function  of  reminding  the  reader  of  the 
inevitability of death without transcendent reward/rebirth (both generally and as regards 
the characters).  Yet that value judgment aligns with the original perverse situation—a 
world  that  does  not  acknowledge  the  possibility  of  return.  It  is  precisely  this 
presupposition that  Kundera wants  to  overthrow.  Is  it  not  more pessimistic  and  self-
delusional to insist on the worthlessness of an earthly life? Undoubtedly Freud would 
agree: his “battle of the giants,” Eros and Thanatos, “is what our nursemaids seek to 
mitigate with their lullaby about heaven” (Freud 58). As above, repetition and recurrence 
signal a kind of ironic joyful dread; they may be difficult realities, but they are more 
truthful and affirming than the alternative. 
There is an important contrast between Nietzsche and Freud in that for the latter 
there is no apocalyptic moment where morality is revalued. While Nietzsche imagines a 
discrete polarity between bad conscience and the “great noontide” of the future where the 
overman will enact a joyful violence (Nietzsche 1969: 336), Freud has a fundamentally 
antagonistic and pessimistic opinion of humanity. He diagnoses our collective neuroses 
and indicts  us  on  anthropological  grounds.  Writing  in  the  wake  of  World  War  I,  he 
meditates on our barbarism: “homo homini lupus [man is a wolf to man],” and maintains 
that “man [i]s a savage beast that has no thought of sparing its own kind” (Freud 48). 
Both of these claims recall Hobbes’s brutal state of nature. He also suggests that love is 
impossible without aggression. Aggression “forms the basis of all affectionate and loving 
relations  among  human  beings”  (Freud  50).  An  echo  of  this  assertion  appears  in 
Kundera’s novel when Sabina thinks to herself “there are things that can be accomplished 
only by violence.  Physical  love is  unthinkable  without  violence” (111).  This passage 
appears as part of the “Short Dictionary of Misunderstood Words,” and thus Sabina’s 
lover Franz declares oppositely “love means renouncing strength” (Kundera 112). Which 
definition has more weight is difficult to discern; what is more important is the weighty 
and recurring process of revaluation, and the “semantic river” of plurality it reveals, as 
opposed to a world which values absolute and singular definitions of words (Kundera 
88). Indeed, there is often a persistent elusiveness to Kundera’s book, where valuations of 
all kinds may be changed from one page to the next. 
Kundera’s attitude towards human waste however is not elusive. He finds waste to 
be another concept excluded from the purview of a linear world besotted with the “sunset 
of dissolution” and suggests that if God created man in his image, then God must have a 
“divine  intestine”  (4,  245).  Of  course  this  is,  in  the  traditional  sense,  theologically 
blasphemous and untenable, and it was not until God expelled man from Paradise that he 
began to  shit,  or  at  least  feel  ashamed  of  his  shit.  Likewise,  “Immediately  after  his 
introduction to disgust, he was introduced to excitement. Without shit…there would be 
no sexual  love as we know it,  accompanied by pounding heart  and blinding senses” 
(247). Kundera’s indictment of the world’s perverse prudery aligns almost exactly with 
Freud’s  discussion  of  anal  eroticism  and  its  repression  in  modern  society.  He  says, 
“Excrement does not arouse any disgust in the child; it seems valuable to him as a part of 
his  body  that  has  become  detached.  Upbringing…will  make  excrement  worthless, 
disgusting, revolting and abominable” (42). Alternatively, “there are certain peoples, even 
in Europe, from whom the pungent genital odours we find offensive are valuable sexual 
stimuli” (44). What is particularly interesting about this passage is that Freud relegates it 
to his footnotes, so that the form of his text mirrors the repression that he diagnoses in 
society.  Bersani  says,  “there  is  nothing  stranger…than  the  erotically  confessional 
footnotes…where [the anthropological imagination of the text] enjoys the fantasy of a 
mythic, prehistoric convulsing of our physical being in the passionate sniffing of a male 
on all fours” (Freud xiii). This convulsing of our physical being is precisely what Sabina 
feels when she has a “fantasy of Tomas seating her on the toilet in her bowler hat and 
watching her void her bowels. Suddenly her heart began to pound and, on the verge of 
fainting, she pulled Tomas down to the rug and immediately let out an orgasmic shout” 
(Kundera 247).
This is merely one example of the recurring theme of anal eroticism in the novel
—shit,  for  Kundera,  is  perhaps  the  penultimate  symbol  highlighting  the  necessity  of 
revaluation and eternal return. How can we call ourselves human if we deny something 
so fundamental to our being? As he says, “you can’t claim shit is immoral” (248). Or, if 
this is humanity’s conception of itself, Kundera finds it distasteful, and would rather step 
down into the shit, or the semantic river, than float away into the land of kitsch (“the 
absolute denial of shit”), totalitarianism,3 and the Grand March of Progress (248).
What does it mean to step down from humanity? It means, Kundera might argue, 
to see oneself as no different from or better than an animal, to shift from a linear mode of 
life to a circular one. This statement need not be valued negatively. Rather, “mankind’s 
true moral test…consists of its attitude towards those who are at  its mercy: animals” 
(Kundera 289). Contra Descartes, who made man “master and proprietor” of nature and 
turned animals into machines to be used/exterminated in whatever manner we see fit, 
Kundera shows us  Nietzsche  and Tereza  “stepping down from the road along which 
mankind…marches onward” (290).  They are next to each other,  appearing before the 
narrator’s eyes again and again, Nietzsche in his moment of collapse, weeping on the 
neck of a horse being beaten by its “master,” and Tereza comforting her “mortally ill 
dog” Karenin (290). Karenin too is a locus for revaluation. A female dog with a male 
name,4 who “knew nothing about the duality of body and soul and had no concept of 
disgust,”  (s)he  surrounds  Tereza  and Tomas  with  “a  completely  selfless  love…a life 
based  on repetition,”  and  is  entirely  happy (Kundera  297,  298).  Humanity’s  love  by 
contrast, is “a priori inferior,” and “cannot be happy; happiness is longing for repetition” 
(298). In a world where the unbearable lightness of being reigns supreme “there’s no 
particular merit in being nice to one’s fellow man…we can never establish with certainty 
what  part  of  our  relations with others  is  the result  of  our  emotions—love,  antipathy, 
charity or malice—and what part is predetermined by the constant power play amongst 
individuals” (Kundera 289).
Thus Kundera’s enigmatic title  affirms lightness only in the sense that eternal 
recurrence  is  a  myth,  not  reality.  The  important  revaluation  is  that  lightness  and  its 
revealed moral perversity is unbearable, while the concept of weight, exemplified by the 
startling idea of eternal return, once discovered, apprehended and appreciated, is actually 
life-affirming and liberating. The path to this cathartic and healing conclusion necessarily 
requires that the individual invert traditional morality and juxtapose disparate concepts. 
But far from being elitist, Nietzsche, and perhaps Kundera, suggest that these apparent 
paradoxes will yield vital results. In Freudian terms, this revaluation helps alleviate some 
of the psychic discontent we feel with civilization. Ultimately, does Kundera side more 
with  Freud  than  he  does  with  Nietzsche?  Freud’s  gloomy  analysis  of  our  oceanic 
aggressive  urges  and  inhumanity  to  each  other,  and  the  injustices  Tereza  and Tomas 
endure at the hands of the Soviets, put a considerable damper on Nietzsche’s optimism 
that the  Ubermensch must come. As Kundera says, “Real life is linked to a series of 
deceptions. It disappoints us with its futility” (Holmberg 25). Instead, while we may be 
liberated  by  accepting  the  finite  moment  that  is  our  life,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
civilization will concur or enhance our freedom. The public and private, as the blurb on 
the  back  of  Kundera’s  novel  attests,  inevitably  intertwine.  We  may  think  or  will  a 
revaluation of values, we may think or will our freedom to its uttermost, but transferring 
these personal desires into our public, lived, acted life is another matter altogether. 
On the other hand, we might argue that Tereza and Tomas are resolved to the 
injustices they suffer, and have the last word over a public sphere that has tried to stamp 
out their individuality and self-expression. But is this really the case? Surely they did not 
wish to die because of a poorly maintained and malfunctioning pickup truck. The last 
section of the book remains a death-haunted one, even if the characters are alive at the 
end. Hana Pichova notes that Karenin dies, Tereza dreams that Tomas dies, and there are 
the stories of the regime killing pigeons and dogs (219). Furthermore, they do not have 
any children. Kundera therefore dispels the idyllic “illusion” of a happy ending on the 
collective farm, which becomes a symbol of dehumanization, death and decay, and leaves 
us  with  serious  questions—will  the  regime  succeed  in  eliminating  freedom  in 
Czechoslovakia?  Will  the  mature  love  Tomas  has  found  for  Tereza  remain  ineffable 
(Pichova 219-220)?
But what of the narrator, who creates the characters and directs the text (Pichova 
217)? Here Nietzsche’s influence returns, regains some of its lost ground, and the “mad 
myth”  of  recurrence  changes  into  a  legitimate,  constituent  part  of  the  novel.  If  only 
between the covers of the book, Kundera has deposed lightness’s last remaining claim to 
validity.  Essentially,  the  narrator’s  compassion  for  his  characters,  in  contrast  to  their 
treatment at the hands of the Soviets,  and his cyclical  manner of telling the story, in 
contrast to a traditional linear narrative, are formal representations of a joyful science. 
The narrator celebrates the truthful,  weighty lives of his characters. As Hana Pichova 
suggests, “the narrator’s choice of narratological strategies and organization reflects his 
desire  to  create  a  textual  world  that  in  no  way  resembles  the  oppressive  world  he 
describes thematically” (217). This “open ended structure” frees the characters on the 
structural level and supports the “characters’ desire for freedom on the thematic level” 
(Pichova 217). The narrator also calls attention to his notions of moral perversions by 
means of the text’s structural recurrences. The text’s sustained and repeated indictments 
of lightness, kitsch, progress and totalitarianism help make these unpalatable concepts “a 
solid mass, permanently protuberant, [their] inanity irreparable” (Kundera 4). Michael 
Henry  Heim’s  translation  is  exceptional—the  alliterative  diction  sparkles,  adding  a 
formal  metaphysical  weight  to  the  argument  against  these  absurdities  that  would 
otherwise  “in  the  sunset  of  dissolution…[be]  illuminated  by  the  aura  of  nostalgia,” 
remaining “ephemeral” and uncondemned (Kundera 4).
Besides the obvious repetition of phrases and sentences, whether it be the book’s 
title or Tomas’s recurring image of Tereza delivered to him in a bulrush basket, prolepsis, 
or  flash-forwards,  as  well  as  flashbacks,  are  prime  examples  of  the  narratological 
strategies Kundera uses in order to give his characters “textual freedom” (Pichova 217). 
Cheryl Forbes reminds us that deliberate conflations of time and space (67) take place 
often—a little more than a third of the way through the novel, in the middle of narrating 
Sabina’s new life in Paris, Kundera suddenly transports us to a time three years in the 
future  where  she  learns  of  Tomas  and  Tereza’s  deaths  due  to  faulty  breaks  in  the 
collective farm’s truck (Kundera 122). The narrator renders this passage in a matter of 
fact  tone,  which compounds its  strangeness  for  the  reader.  We are  unsettled  because 
Tomas and Tereza were still intensely alive for us, and now we expect their untimely 
deaths. Instead, we continue through the novel without ever witnessing their deaths first-
hand, or learning what they thought as they fell off that cliff, trapped in the unrepaired 
truck,  toward  the  earth.  This  fact  reveals  a  crucial  methodological  decision  on  the 
narrator’s part: “he never immerses himself in the interior world of his characters, a world 
that is sacred to all who have once been denied freedom” (Pichova 224). The narrator 
remains sensitive to his characters’ sovereignty, often only approximating their thoughts 
for the reader. Tomas and Tereza have, therefore, in a fundamental sense, retained their 
freedom and eluded the surrounding death. The end of the novel finds them alive, and, we 
could argue, using Nietzsche’s phrase, “longing for nothing more fervently” than to be 
bound together as lovers and partners (Nietzsche 2001: 195). 
The last thing Tomas tells Tereza is this: “it’s a terrific relief to realize you’re free, 
free of all missions” (Kundera 313). He is free from his obsession to “desire and discover 
and appropriate” the unique, intimate parts of women, and the unique bodies presented 
before his surgeon’s scalpel (Kundera 200). This wholly cerebral, loveless obsession was 
his unbearable lightness, driving him forever on into a succession of women’s arms, so 
that einmal ist keinmal—whatever happens once, might as well not have happened at all 
(Kundera 8). Having jettisoned this false positive, he crashes back to earth, transformed 
by the recurring claim Tereza has laid upon him. She appeared to him as no other woman 
had,  as  “a  child  someone  had  put  in  a  bulrush  basket  daubed  with  pitch  and  sent 
downstream for [him] to fetch at the riverbank of his bed” (Kundera 6). She has the same 
function  as  Moses,  founder  of  monotheism,  that  of  a  catalyst  which  precipitates  a 
monumental revaluation of values, in this case Tomas’s values. Tomas cannot help but 
love Tereza. Since “chance and chance alone has a message for us,” it is the recurrence of 
this  fortuitous  circumstance  in  his  mind  which,  once  he  accepts  the  heavy 
“responsibility”  that  she  has  “offer[ed]  him  up  her  life,”  will  both  crucify  him  and 
resurrect him (Kundera 48, 6). The revaluation is this: Tomas’s desire for control and 
bachelorhood  becomes  weightless  and  careless,  but  surrendering  to  chance  will  be 
weighty and meaningful. Tereza realizes this at the end—recalling her dream where she 
and Tomas descend from an airplane to an airfield, where Tomas is shot and transforms 
into  a  rabbit,  “it  mean[t]  losing  all  strength…one  is  no  stronger  than  the  other…” 
(Kundera 313). Thus, she experiences 
…the same odd happiness and odd sadness as then. The sadness meant: we are at 
the last station. The happiness meant: we are together. The sadness was the form, 
the happiness the content. Happiness filled the space of sadness (Kundera 313-
314). 
 
Antithetical as it seems, happiness occupies, in this revaluation, a space it was previously 
denied; Tomas and Tereza’s “incipit tragoedia” is counterbalanced by their  newfound 
detachment from humanity’s perverse morality (Nietzsche 2001: 195). 
Thus, they best embody the myth of eternal recurrence in the novel because they 
have reached beyond the grave to  replay their  lives  for  us;  the repetitive,  non-linear 
narrative forces us to pay greater attention to their predicaments, their sorrows, and their 
joys.  Their  actions  take  on  an  extra,  bittersweet  resonance;  they  have  accrued  extra 
weight. Yet the price of this victory is high—they lose their lives, not naturally, but at the 
hands  of  a  totalitarian  regime.  We  remember  them  more  distinctly  than  Sabina  for 
returning to the East, to Czechoslovakia, for being “crushed to a pulp,” for choosing to 
stay  with  each  other  instead  of  seeking  any  one  of  their  “infinite  number  of 
unconsummated  loves”  (Kundera  122,  34).  Conversely,  Sabina  remains  mired  in 
“emptiness”  and “betrayal,”  and  wants  “her  dead body to  be  cremated  and its  ashes 
thrown to the wind” (Kundera 122). She wishes to “die under the sign of lightness,” and 
so she will, moving farther West as the novel progresses, ultimately disappearing from 
the narrative (Kundera 273). What remains of Sabina? Not even kitsch. 
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1 There is a long and heated critical debate concerning whether eternal recurrence is cosmologically true. For the sake of 
brevity, since recent scientific research finds this argument improbable, and since Kundera treats it as a myth, I will do 
the same. See also Spinks pg. 129.
2 Nehamas also makes this conclusion, noting that the Genealogy, specifically Essay II, 16 “anticipates not only Freud’s 
pessimistic conclusions…but also the very reasoning that led Freud to them” (247).
3 The controversy over Tomas’s newspaper article on Oedipus, and the regime’s subsequent pressure upon him, may be 
read as an example of the law of the father(land) punishing its son for revolting. Even without such a strict Freudian 
interpretation, there is a repetitive engagement with the Oedipal story throughout the novel. 
4 See pg. 238-239, where Kundera’s mention of hermaphroditism corresponds closely to Freud’s assertion that “Man too 
is an animal with an unequivocally bisexual disposition” (42). 
